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Alongside capital, land, and labour, electricity is perhaps the key input for 
capital accumulation today. This chapter uses evidence from the power sector to 
unsettle two key frames that are commonly applied to analyse contemporary 
India’s political economy. First, the sector’s continually poor performance casts 
doubt on the extent of the state’s ‘pro-business tilt’. The pattern of subsidies and 
rents suggests that this tilt has in practice been limited, painful, and regionally 
uneven. Second, the persistence of inter-elite competition has shaped a distinctive 
dynamic of institutional change in the sector: liberalization as segmentation. 
Market institutions and producer subsidies have not displaced the statist system, 
but have been grafted onto it. The resulting system is characterized by uneven 
private investment and influence, and institutionalizes twin sets of subsidies for 
politically important consumer groups on one side and politically connected 
producers on the other. There remain serious doubts about the financial and 




Alongside capital, land, and labour, energy—and especially electricity—is the key input 
for contemporary capital accumulation. Electricity is fundamental to distributive conflicts 
and the politics of natural resource mobilization. It has also been inextricably bound up 
with the Indian state project and regional modes of governance for over a century (Kale 
2014b). Reflecting this importance, power was the first major sector opened to private 
																																																								
1 I am very grateful to Barbara Harriss-White and to conference participants at the Indira Gandhi 
Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, for useful comments on an earlier version of this chapter.  
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investors in 1991. Since then it has witnessed almost a quarter-century of institutional 
restructuring to recalibrate the state’s role. By 2014, it was taken to provide evidence of 
both catchphrases of the general election, ‘crony capitalism’ and ‘policy paralysis’. For all 
these reasons, Arvind Subramanian (2012) compared it to the Dandi Salt March of 1930: 
‘Is power, or rather the power sector, today’s salt—emblematic of both the pessimistic 
outlook and promise of India?’  
The power sector therefore provides a crucial lens on Indian political economy. 
This chapter assesses the light that developments in the sector cast on contemporary 
Indian political economy from two related angles: the changing balance of power 
between dominant socioeconomic groups, and the country’s distinctive trajectory of 
institutional change as it has been shaped by these constraints. It shows that power sector 
evidence unsettles two key analytical frames that are commonly applied to liberalization-
era India.  
First, and most obviously, the sector’s continually poor performance casts doubt 
on the extent of the state’s ‘pro-business tilt’, seen by many as the hallmark of the era of 
economic reforms from the 1980s onwards.2 A survey of contemporary power subsidies 
for consumers and producers instead reveals an admixture of continuity and change in 
India’s ‘basic political equilibrium’ (Bardhan 1998). Despite almost a quarter-century of 
putative liberalization, in many States consumer-side electricity subsidies persist, most 
notoriously those which go to wealthy farmers. Meanwhile, poor-quality supply 
continues to damage industrial and commercial interests, aside from a narrow subset of 
well-connected energy producers. This pattern of subsidies and rents suggests that the 
pro-business tilt has in practice been limited, painful, and regionally uneven.  
Second, this persistent inter-elite competition has fostered a distinctive dynamic 
of institutional change in the sector, a dynamic which troubles conventional accounts of 
liberalization as a single global process of displacing the statist system. The process of 
reform has instead been accretive, quite different to the institutional displacement that is 
associated with the archetypical, Anglo-American mode of ‘deregulatory’ liberalization.3 
Market institutions and producer subsidies have not displaced the statist system, but 
have been grafted onto it. The result is a form of liberalization as segmentation: the twin 
																																																								
2 The phrase is Atul Kohli’s (Kohli 2006, 2012; see also Rodrik and Subramanian 2004). Subsequently 
the notion that ‘industrial capitalists are now the dominant group within the state apparatus’ (Gupta 
and Sivaramakrishnan 2011, 6), systematically favoured by government policy, has since received wide 
credence. See, for example, Chatterjee (2008, 61) and the consensus presented in Tillin (2013).  
3 On Anglo-American ‘deregulatory’ liberalization and institutional displacement, see Thelen (2012, 
146–7). Of course, even in the United States and Britain liberalization has had limits, as is revealed by 
Paul Pierson’s celebrated work on the resilience of welfare state institutions (Pierson 1994). 
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sets of subsidies—for politically important consumer groups on one side, and politically 
connected producers on the other—are institutionalized in a segmented ‘dual-track 
economy, whereby state-run and market-run production exist side-by-side’ (Joseph 2010, 
503). Just as interest-group competition constrains the potential for sweeping 
institutional change, the new politics of the reform era are in turn informed by this 
segmented system.  
That India’s reform process has been characterized by a ‘very special type of 
gradualism’4 is well known. This type of incremental, partial reform has often been seen 
as strategic ‘reform by stealth’ (Jenkins 1999); or, especially in the electricity sector, as a 
pathway toward second-best ‘reform without losers’ analogous to that taken by China 
(Joseph 2010; see also Victor and Heller 2007). Instead this chapter suggests that, at least 
in the power sector, the state-market hybrid system is neither stable nor coherent. Not 
only is it failing virtually all categories of consumers; it is financed through the short-
term exploitation of natural resources and state-owned enterprises, and through the 
suppression of demand. Rather than stealthy gradualism, then, the ad hoc compromises 
of the reform process have so far institutionalized a system which is technically, 
financially, and environmentally dysfunctional.  
 The first half of the chapter explores the lessons from power sector evidence 
about the relative influence of competing dominant socioeconomic groups since 1991. It 
surveys major subsidies in the power sector today, providing a snapshot of its regionally 
varied political economy after more than two decades of putative reforms. The second 
half examines the constrained trajectory of institutional reform that this has helped to 
shape and through which these multiple subsidies are institutionalized, before examining 
the sustainability of this emergent system.  
 
Electricity subsidies: continuity and change in the ‘basic political equilibrium’ 
This section provides a review of contemporary electricity subsidies, both consumer- and 
producer-side. The utility of electricity subsidies—and the informal subsidy that is 
politically condoned and systematic power theft—as an indicator of wider trends is well 
established, both as an indicator of the relative power of different socioeconomic groups 
(Golden and Min 2013) and a proxy for governance quality (Smith 2004; Kochhar et al. 
2006; Subramanian 2012). 
Across South Asia inadequate electricity supply is the biggest problem 
businessmen report facing (Ahmed and Ghani 2007, 11). Improved power has become a 
																																																								
4 Montek Singh Ahluwalia, quoted in Jenkins (2004, 348).  
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major target of industrial lobbying. We might thus expect that a state undergoing a ‘pro-
business tilt’ would alter policy to favour big business consumers hit by both 
internationally uncompetitive electricity costs and, more importantly, low quality of 
supply.5 As large consumer subsidies for non-industrial and non-commercial users are 
widely recognized as a key cause of the sector’s problems, we would expect a reduction 
in these subsidies.  
Instead, while the proximate causes of the sector’s poor performance have 
somewhat shifted over time, the persistence of consumer subsidies and the 
incompleteness of reforms continue to harm most categories of industrial and 
commercial consumers. Evidence from the contemporary power sector thus suggests that 
the pro-business tilt has been painful, incomplete, and geographically uneven. 
 
Agricultural power 
The most notorious set of consumer-side subsidies in India go to agricultural consumers. 
In the first decade after independence, many State governments subsidized power for 
industrial users.6 From the 1960s, as Green Revolution policies helped to spread irrigated 
agriculture, this pattern began to be reversed. The power sector came to be characterized 
by increasingly large subsidies for agricultural users, an ‘energy–irrigation nexus’ 
subsidized by higher tariffs for industrial and commercial consumers. Electricity 
consumption by the agricultural sector grew at an annual average compound rate of over 
14 per cent between 1960/61 and 1970/71. This locked farmers into irrigation-dependent 
agricultural systems, creating a burgeoning environmental crisis and leading to a cycle of 
persistent underinvestment and low performance for many State utilities.  
The beneficiaries of these subsidies tended to be wealthier farmers, able to afford 
to install and maintain tubewells. The subsidies have thus been read as ‘widely 
representative of the distortions associated with the political economy of reform in India’ 
(Sen and Jamasb 2012, 86). Analysts of independent India’s ‘first-generation’ political 
economy used them as archetypical evidence of the influence of the dominant proprietary 
class of wealthy agriculturalists (Bardhan 1998 [1984], 46–7, 61; Varshney 1995). State-
level evidence supports this emphasis on rural influence. The pro-agriculture shift in tariff 
																																																								
5 As had been suggested as early as a World Bank survey in 1962 (King 1967, 229-231), industrial 
consumers appear to prioritize quality rather price concerns (see also Joseph 2010, 509). 
6 Constitutional responsibility for electricity is shared between the centre and States, although the latter 
have responsibility for distribution (the all-important ‘last mile’ of delivery to individual consumers). 
The crucial institutions were the State electricity boards (SEBs), vertically integrated monopolies 
formed under the 1948 Electricity (Supply) Act. In most cases they came to operate as extensions of 
State energy ministries, relying on inconsistent payments from State governments.  
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subsidies was not regionally even, but was especially pronounced in States with powerful 
agricultural lobbies.7 In mirror image, public-choice theorists considered them a typical 
example of patronage politics. Increasingly intense party-political competition led to 
downward pressure on agricultural tariffs as politicians competed to offer sops to 
wealthy farmers, who came to use power subsidies ‘as a litmus test to judge whether 
politicians will serve their interests’ (Victor 2009, 19; Wilkinson 2006; Tongia 2007; 
Golden and Min 2013, 90–95).  
Moreover, often these subsidies pitted large farmers’ interests against their 
industrial rivals directly, both through cross-subsidization and the allocation of scarce 
supply. In Andhra Pradesh, for example, rural electrification led to government-
mandated power cuts for industrial consumers (Kale 2014a, 149). As a result large 
businesses increasingly exercised their option to exit the state-owned system. Industrial 
consumers, who accounted for almost two-thirds of total SEB sales in 1960, increasingly 
resorted to captive power plants. By 1991 the industrial share of public power usage had 
diminished to only 40 per cent. The rise of captive generation was particularly 
pronounced in States with poor utility performance and high transmission and 
distribution losses—and even more strongly linked to higher consumption from electrical 
pumpsets in the agricultural sector (Joseph 2010). 
Has economic liberalization substantively changed this scenario? The initiation of 
power sector reforms in 1991—with the advent of independent power producers (IPPs) 
in the generation segment—brought no sharp break. Regional political economies of 
power appeared path-dependent in the medium term. Kale (2014a) forcefully argues that 
States with powerful farmer lobbies and high levels of ‘wet’ agriculture were both early 
rural electrifiers and found it difficult to reform their power sectors in the early years 
after 1991. Such States, even those which are otherwise considered comparatively 
industry- and FDI-friendly, struggled to raise electricity tariffs and thus with a cycle of 
underinvestment and power cuts. Faced with elections immediately after the passage of 
the ‘watershed’ Electricity Act of 2003, Andhra Pradesh, Punjab, Maharashtra, and 
Tamil Nadu all promised free power to farmers, while the reformist chief minister 
Chandrababu Naidu’s 2004 election loss was widely regarded as a response to his push 
																																																								
7 This is clearly demonstrated by Kale (2014a). Tamil Nadu, for example, enjoyed relatively high levels 
of rural electrification even before 1947, and turned early to cross-subsidization of rural electrification 
by industrialists. As a result it suffered from power shortages by the 1970s (ibid, 170). As early as 
1968, Punjab turned to flat metering of agricultural power and Maharashtra in 1977; in the latter, 
although Mumbai remained an enclave of private ownership, the power sector accounted for 40 per 
cent of planned allocations by 1978 (ibid, 62–99). The relationship was iterative, Kale shows: States in 
which farmers mobilized or gained influence within government enjoyed higher levels of rural 
electrification; rural electrification in turn reinforced the growing power of these groups. 
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for power reform in Andhra Pradesh. In contrast, States with less dominant farmer 
lobbies appeared better placed: Odisha, with low levels of rural electrification and 
irrigated agriculture, became the unlikely pioneer of power reforms in the 1990s. Delhi, 
the only other province to privatize distribution, was also precociously urban (Kale 2007, 
139–83).  
By the early 2000s, industrial and commercial tariffs remained double those for 
domestic consumers, and more than 10 times those for agriculture (Tongia 2007, 129). 
Agriculture has accounted for around 25 per cent of total electricity consumption since 
1990, but 4 per cent of total revenue—and only 7 per cent as late as 2011 (Table 1). The 
gap between subsidies booked by State utilities and the amount actually received from 
governments has continued to grow, between 2003 and 2011 reaching a cumulative total 
of $10 billion (Pargal and Banerjee 2014, 7). 
 
Table 1. Changing consumer mix over time 
 Share of consumption (%) Share of revenue (%) 
1991 2001 2011 1991 2001 2011 
Agriculture 26 26 23 4 4 7 
Domestic 17 25 24 11 16 20 
Industrial, commercial 
and others 
57 49 53 83 79 72 
From Figure 4.13 in Pargal and Banerjee (2014, 85), using Planning Commission data  
 
More than two decades after 1991, electricity subsidies remain a pillar of the 
‘subsidy syndrome’ in Indian agriculture and the sector continues to be plagued by 
endemic load-shedding and financial turmoil. Power sector evidence thus provides some 
support for the notion that larger agriculturalists remain a dominant socioeconomic 
grouping, especially in certain States. 
 
Plural elites 
Nonetheless, the ‘basic political equilibrium’ has not remained static. Nor are 
agricultural consumers a monolithic class or the only group with an interest in the 
maintenance of the unreformed status quo. The political economy of power subsidies 
today is more complex than the classic emphasis on agriculture versus industry or ‘rural 
bias’ might suggest.  
First, agriculturalists are a diverse group. The benefits of rural electrification and 
subsidies have historically not only been concentrated among larger landholders, but 
have often favoured those cultivating specific water-intensive crops: the wheat and rice 
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farmers of Punjab and the ‘sugar barons’ of western Maharashtra with their links to 
urban politics, for example (Kale 2014a). This has only become more apparent as the 
liberalization era has progressed. Evidence is mounting that virtually all categories of 
consumer would be willing to pay more for a higher quality of service (Santhakumar 
2008)—including large ‘progressive farmers’ oriented to export markets (Kale 2007, 
263–7). In the Bharatiya Janata Party’s 2014 general election campaign, consistent rather 
than free power appeared to become the political promise of choice.  
As this suggests, regional political economies are not frozen landscapes; path 
dependence is not fate. There are indications of a shift in power or the willingness of 
politicians and regulators to take on rural interests: in recent years, all-India average 
agricultural tariffs have risen faster than those for other groups, although they remain 
low (Planning Commission 2014, 157). Several States with historically powerful 
agricultural lobbies have partially restored the financial health of their utilities. Most 
famously, Gujarat took administrative action to recalibrate the subsidy regime by 
separating out rural feeder lines into (cheap but unreliable) farm- and (more expensive 
but higher-quality) non-farm supplies, an idea recently imitated in seven other States.8 
Several of the worst loss-making States have embarked upon reforms, including Madhya 
Pradesh and Rajasthan, while Andhra Pradesh and Maharashtra both score highly for 
power governance reforms.9  
The pace of change should not be exaggerated. In many States agricultural 
subsidies and power theft are declining only slowly. Tamil Nadu, Punjab, Andhra 
Pradesh, and Haryana continue with agricultural tariffs well below the all-India average 
(Planning Commission 2014, 198). Today the most dramatic losses—and debts—are 
concentrated in a small number of States, including Madhya Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, 
Jharkhand, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh (Pargal and Banerjee 2014, 55–6, 61). In 2011, 
only Kerala, Delhi, and West Bengal had tariffs that covered costs and made profits 
without requiring a subsidy. Nationally, the gap between cost and revenue has virtually 
doubled since 2003: across India the ratio of sales revenue to cost was only 66 per cent in 
2011-12 (Planning Commission 2014, 161). This is due not to any major expansion of 
subsidies and theft, but rather rising interest costs and the soaring cost of purchased 
power, thanks to increasing fuel prices and poor power procurement planning 
																																																								
8 For a review of varying State experiences with the separation of rural feeders, see ASTAE (2014). 
While Gujarat has successfully controlled financial losses from the agricultural sector, evidence from 
Rajasthan is more mixed.  
9 As measured by a 2013 reform implementation scorecard by Deloitte and the World Bank (see Pargal 
and Banerjee 2014, 97–104).  
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(Bhattacharya and Patel 2011; Pargal and Banerjee 2014, 71–6). Nonetheless, the 
sector’s older political settlement constrains utilities’ ability to raise tariffs enough to 
compensate for these rising costs.  
The responsibility of agricultural subsidies for the financial plight of the power 
sector has often been exaggerated, however.10 Other interests are also implicated in the 
proliferation of subsidies and blocking reforms. Domestic consumption remains 
extensively subsidized, if less heavily than agriculture in most States.11 Again, these 
subsidies largely go to elites: in 21 States fixed or minimum consumption charges mean 
that low-consumption households pay more than higher-consumption households (Pargal 
and Banerjee 2014, 84). Farmer lobbies are not the only interests to mobilize to block 
tariff rises, as demonstrated by urban activism in Delhi—for example, through the 
middle-class United Residents’ Joint Action (URJA) and the Aam Admi Party’s stance 
towards tariff revision. 
For many years, too, agricultural subsidies were calculated as a residual, masking 
poor utility productivity and power theft, and systematically underestimating 
consumption by domestic and industrial consumers (Gulati and Narayanan 2000). In 
2011 the all-India average aggregate technical and commercial losses had dropped by 12 
per cent since 2003, but still stood at 26 per cent of power generated—five times the 
estimate for China (Pargal and Banerjee 2014, 5). Again, there is wide regional variation 
in this figure. States which have succeeded in reducing transmission and distribution 
(T&D) losses include Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Punjab. In contrast, States with 
extremely high levels of T&D losses, and correspondingly poor-quality supply, include 
Jammu & Kashmir, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh, and much of the 
Northeast. In such States theft is not simply a matter of micro-level corruption but is a 
tacitly condoned informal subsidy: Min and Golden (2014, 624) demonstrate that in UP 
tolerating power theft became ‘part of deliberate political strategy’, rising around 
elections. There appears to be a distinction, then, between regimes with influential farmer 
lobbies and a well-institutionalized tradition of ‘electric populism’ (see Kale 2014a), and 
less well-institutionalized systems in which clientelism is associated with weak rule of law 
and corruption (Smith 2004). 
																																																								
10 Indeed, Gulati and Narayanan (2003) argued that policy in general is biased against agricultural 
interests. 
11 In 2011-12, the all-India average tariff for domestic consumers was 313.72 paise/kWh, compared to 
143.64 for agricultural, 513.92 for industrial, and 689.88 for commercial consumers (Planning 
Commission 2014, 195). Domestic subsidies were estimated to cost Rs. 37,047 crore nationwide, 
compared to Rs. 57,901 crore for agricultural subsidies (ibid, 211, 208).   
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Who steals all this power? While much theft is undoubtedly rural,12 the extremely 
high levels of T&D losses in Delhi before privatization—almost 60 per cent—suggest 
that urban constituencies are also often implicated, and on a scale that cannot be blamed 
on theft in urban slums. The then power secretary argued in 2000 that the sector’s 
problems had been misdiagnosed throughout the first decade of reforms: ‘the reality is in 
a very organized manner electricity is pilfered by large consumers in industrial groups 
and high-income residential and commercial groups’ (Shahi 2005, 280). In 1998, for 
example, news broke of a set of mini-steel plants in Maharashtra that had systematically 
stolen power worth Rs. 20 crore (Smith 2004, 2069). Like the exit of business consumers 
to captive options, such high levels of theft have trapped some utilities in a spiral of weak 
revenues and underinvestment.  
There therefore exists a wide, if incoherent, coalition of interests with an interest 
in retaining elements of the consumer subsidy regime—thereby damaging wider business 
interests. There has been a set of business interests that has benefited from reforms since 
1991, however, albeit inconsistently: large, politically connected domestic energy players 
who receive producer-side subsidies.13 Most notorious were the lavishly attractive terms 
offered to independent power producers (IPPs) in the 1990s, including the public 
shouldering of default risk, as ‘attracting capital became an end in itself, rather than a 
considered means’ (Dubash 2011, 70).  
Even after mitigating the excesses of the first decade after 1991, privileged firms 
still receive generous terms from the state. These include subsidies, tax holidays, 
guaranteed rates of return, soft loans, and the discretionary allocation of natural 
resources such as coal blocks, land, and land-based financing, as the breaking of the 
‘Coalgate’ coal block allocation scandal in 2012 revealed. A study of 19 ‘average’ 
thermal projects (i.e. excluding the excesses of some early projects like Enron’s Dabhol 
plant in Maharashtra) by the World Institute for Sustainable Energy found that 
cumulative subsidies amounted to 150 per cent of the original investment (WISE 2008). 
Furthermore, while overly generous power purchase agreements are mostly a thing of the 
past thanks to competitive bidding, large corporations have made sustained efforts to 
																																																								
12 Again drawing on evidence from UP, Golden and Min (2013) suggest that the beneficiaries of theft 
may also be wealthy farmers, as their supply is unmetered and so easy to expand (though the same may 
be true when meters are tampered with). They find evidence both that wealthy farmers benefit 
regardless of the party elected, and that parties reward domestic voters in their ‘core’ strongholds 
(rather than those in swing constituencies). 
13 Labour interests, implicated in the literature as a common obstacle to reforms, have more often been 
outmanoeuvred. The number of utility employees has dropped from 977,000 in 1998-99 to 660,000 in 
2011-12, and the number of employees per thousand customers from 9.89 to 0.36 over the same 
period (Planning Commission 2014, 150). It is telling, though, that Gujarat’s successful power reforms 
involved patiently working with utility staff rather than tackling them directly.  
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renegotiate agreements where they have become less than favourable, a persistent 
problem in Indian infrastructure sectors (Pratap 2013).  
These benefits do not apply equally to all firms. For example, companies not 
awarded captive coal blocks have struggled to compete in the midst of the fuel supply 
crisis. Unsurprisingly, given the rent-intensive nature of utilities sectors, the beneficiaries 
of the pro-business tilt in the power sector have so far comprised not ‘business’ as a 
whole but only a narrow subset of industrial interests. In practice policymakers often 
favour well-connected ‘powerbroker’ firms with particularistic closed deals rather than 
fostering open competition (Sen and Kar 2014). Some of these benefits—for example 
favourable access to natural resources and the very generous rates of return built into 
many contracts—also apply to central public sector undertakings (CPSUs) like NTPC.14 
For their shared combination of political connections and adequate technical 
management, some scholars bracket both privileged state and private enterprises together 
as ‘dual firms’ (Tongia 2007; Victor and Heller 2007).15 These incumbents form a new 
constituency that favours reforms of a particular type: gradual, opaque, and 
particularistic (ibid).  
Such particularistic rents have proved unstable, however. As in the wider 
economy, the ‘closed deal’ world of the era of high mineral prices and high economic 
growth gradually brought about ‘negative feedback effects’ as the national regime’s 
legitimacy fell (Sen and Kar 2014). Closed deals upstream in the power sector proved 
especially difficult to legitimize in the longer term because the sector’s performance 
remains poor in many areas. Many private projects have become stranded or financially 
unviable after changes in coal availability and regulation.  
This brief survey of power sector subsidies confirms the resilience of agricultural 
influence in some States. It thus suggests that the fragmentation of de facto political 
power among interest groups continues, with large industrial and commercial interests 
remaining the most obvious losers from the continuing underperformance that this 
engenders. In an updated epilogue to his 1984 work which considered the early years of 
liberalization, Pranab Bardhan thus singled out electricity subsidies as evidence that ‘one 
should not exaggerate the extent of shift in the basic political equilibrium’ (1998, 129–
30). Writing from the alternative perspective of Kalecki’s ‘intermediate regime’, Barbara 
																																																								
14 Formerly the National Thermal Power Corporation.  
15 Their examples include NTPC on one hand and Reliance and Tata on the other. The discussion of the 
system’s sustainability below clarifies the difference between public and private players on this front, 
however, arguing that public sector enterprises are open to other forms of short-term exploitation by 
the state to help fund the subsidy economy. 
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Harriss-White agreed that ‘[i]n practice, control of the economy is being wrenched with 
the greatest difficulty from the “intermediate classes”’, with ‘considerable inertia and 
indecision in tackling the very largest state transfers’ like power subsidies (2003, 65). 
That these interests are elite is clear, and such elite pluralism has led to fundamentally 
inegalitarian outcomes. Three-quarters of Indians lack regular access to commercial 
energy for household use—300 million people still lack power altogether—yet in 2010 
only 13 per cent of subsidy payments went to households below the poverty line (Pargal 
and Banerjee 2014, 86–7).  
Nonetheless, the reform era has brought changes in this pattern of subsidies. 
First, there is some evidence that virtually all categories of consumer would be willing to 
pay more for higher-quality supply—though middle-class activism in Delhi despite the 
city’s improved supply suggests that mistrust of politicians and private firms may subvert 
this. Second, the shift from a state-centred to a partially reformed system has created 
new, if unstable, rents for some producer firms. The coexistence of both older consumer 
subsidies and new producer subsidies raises crucial questions about the institutional 
trajectory of reform, to which we turn now.  
 
Forging a dual-track system: India’s distinctive dynamic of institutional change 
The presence of a broad coalition of interests with some stake in maintaining the status 
quo constrains the direction of reform. As the then chairman of the Central Electricity 
Regulatory Commission stated in 2012: ‘The political economy of the sector is crucial. 
Utilities are nothing but extension of government in developing countries… Solutions 
must lie within the existing political settlement.’16 This section examines the distinctive 
trajectory of institutional reform that has resulted from these political-economic 
constraints.  
 Since 1991 the power sector has witnessed broadly three phases of reform. The 
first phase amended the 1948 Electricity (Supply) Act to permit private players to enter 
the sector as independent power producers (IPPs) with long-term contracts to supply 
State utilities. The second phase of reform involved a period of State-level experiments 
with SEB restructuring, independent regulators, and the privatization of distribution, 
informed by the World Bank’s so-called ‘global template’ for power reforms (World 
Bank 1993). Both of these phases were regarded as comparative failures for their high 
costs and lack of success in attracting sustained private investor interest. The policy 
fiascos of the 1990s and the arrival of a more stable national regime in 1999 together 
																																																								
16 At a CRISIL power sector seminar, New Delhi, 7 May 2012. 
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provided fuel for more thoroughgoing reform. In the third phase, the centre took up the 
initiative through the drafting and (attempted) enactment of the Electricity Act of 2003, 
in which competition superseded the thornier issue of privatization as a silver bullet. 
 While on paper the Electricity Act was in many ways a radical piece of pro-
market legislation, in practice the striking facts have been institutional continuity and 
institutional proliferation alongside the changes prescribed by the ‘global template’. 
Given the political-economic constraints that policymakers face—as well as serious 
intellectual and ideological challenges to the continued relevance of the global template—
the sector has witnessed not a process of liberalization as deregulation but something far 
more segmented and dualistic.  
Deregulatory liberalization involves the explicit dismantling of older institutions 
through direct assault (Thelen 2012, 147). In contrast, the mode of liberalization in the 
Indian power sector amounts to a form of dualization:17 it ‘do[es] not necessarily imply 
any direct and comprehensive attack on organized interests, but only the enlargement of 
certain areas of the economy within which market forces and associated relations of 
authority and control are able to operate more freely than in others’ (Goldthorpe 1984, 
329; Thelen 2012). The process of institutional change that this type of liberalization 
brings is necessarily more marked by compromise and continuities than the more familiar 
deregulatory model, because it is shaped by distinct political dynamics: the persistent 
inter-elite competition outlined in the first section. The practical result in the power 
sector has been the creation of a layered and improvised state-market hybrid that 
institutionalizes the uneven involvement of the private sector alongside the continuation 
of older subsidies and statist instruments.  
 
The segmented policy process 
The broad political-economy changes introduced in the previous section are mediated 
through institutions. With constitutional responsibility for power policy shared between 
the centre and States, and with energy policy strewn across different ministries until 
2014, the fragmentary nature of the state and the fragmentary character of the political 
settlement prove mutually reinforcing. They facilitate the creation of a segmented policy 
																																																								
17 ‘Dualization’ is typically associated with developments in labour markets: the segmentation of the 
labour force between a core of privileged, unionized ‘insiders’ and the growing mass of ‘outsiders’ 
denied many of the benefits and stability that accrue to the core. Here I am more interested in a similar 
dynamic of institutional change to that pinpointed by Thelen (2012). The practical dynamic is reversed: 
rather than leaving intact a set of state-supported elites, power sector reform has left the state-owned 
residual to decay, though again a new market-oriented zone profits. I prefer the term ‘segmentation’ to 
‘dualization’ because it more accurately captures the organizational incoherence and complexity that 
has accompanied this dynamic.  
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process in which particular groups are differentially able to influence various 
policymaking activities.  
Today there is widespread agreement among influential Indian scholars that 
federalism has facilitated reform by fragmenting opposition (see especially Jenkins 1999). 
Yet the same proliferation also fragments the spread of reforms. The Indian state’s 
organizational structure—multi-tiered and increasingly complex—provides multiple 
points of entry for new rent-seeking strategies and multiple veto points at which these 
strategies can be resisted. To stylize, residential and agricultural elites rely upon their 
influence on State governments through the ballot box, regulators, and the courts, and 
typically seek to influence particular policy implementation decisions, such as tariff rises. 
Private firms instead rely not upon electoral weight but on high-level lobbying, seeking to 
influence earlier stages of the policy process—agenda setting and policy formulation—
behind closed doors. The fragmented state system enables both sets of groups to exercise 
influence upon different levels of the state. In this way ‘reform by stealth’ also produces 
unreformed zones outside its heartlands: it produces segmentation.  
As the regionally differentiated subsidy patterns discussed above suggest, the 
federal division of responsibility for electricity has often facilitated resistance to power 
reforms at the State level. In this context, attempts at liberalization amount to form of 
discreet centralization, providing the newly ‘fiscal disciplinarian’ central government with 
instruments to reorient the sector away from the older subsidy regime (Rudolph and 
Rudolph 2001). The centre uses its not considerable financial sway as both carrot and 
stick to incentivize reform compliance, both rewarding restructuring and disciplining 
States for underperformance. The centre’s ability to harden budget constraints is limited 
in practice, however. States can circumvent controls, for example through 
underpayments to central generation firms, market borrowing, or using capital 
allocations to cover operating costs.  
The state’s fissures are not only vertical. Horizontal competition between state 
agencies and ministries also until recently undermined comprehensive energy planning by 
institutionalizing representation for naturally opposed interests—like the power and coal 
sectors—in different bodies at the apex of the state. In such a ‘byzantine and fragmented’ 
bureaucracy, India has had virtually no coordinated energy planning (Dubash 2011, 67). 
Federalism and institutional proliferation thus together act to compartmentalize and 
concentrate societal influence while weakening state coordination, so interest-group 
competition does not simply facilitate state autonomy. Whether the current trend of 




The dual-track power sector 
This fragmentation of political power between different elites, institutionalized through a 
vertically and horizontally fragmented state, leads to a reform process marked by 
unevenness and compromise. The result has not been sweeping privatization or a simple 
state transition from provider to facilitator. It is instead ‘more accurate to describe the 
market as grafted on to rather than replacing the state sector, and with decidedly mixed 
results’ (Dubash 2011, 69). Today around 36 per cent of installed generation capacity is 
owned and financed by the private sector, compared with 27 per cent for the centre and 
37 per cent for the States.18 More than this, thanks to the political inability to tackle 
older consumer subsidies head-on, competing interests dominate in almost parallel 
domains of the power sector. Change has been introduced at the margins or in parallel, 
while the state system continued to drift into financial unviability.  
The system’s financial problems are primarily down to distribution. Yet the first 
phase of reform, the IPP policy, did not deal directly with the politicization of the 
distribution segment. It focused narrowly on increasing generation capacity and 
mobilizing scarce capital, thereby ‘promising to support rather than dismantle the 
existing [political-economic] matrix’ (Kale 2014a, 99). The emphasis was not on 
privatization, but the introduction of new greenfield projects in parallel with the public 
system. This continues with the ultra mega power plants of the twenty-first century, 
partnerships which fuse the private sector with renewed state activism.  
Even after distribution was recognized as a gaping hole in the reform process, 
politicians and technocrats have struggled to reform the segment—it is simply too 
politically unpalatable. As a result, reform has often taken the form of unsuccessful 
backdoor initiatives, which layer new institutions atop or alongside the sediment of the 
state-owned system rather than displacing it. Independent regulatory agencies were 
imported ‘through the back door’ as part of the World Bank’s global template, in order 
to depoliticize tariff-setting and encourage private investment (Dubash 2013). This was 
no strategic reform by stealth, however. Instead, the uncritical fashion in which the 
agencies were transplanted meant that they were swiftly forced to creatively 
accommodate ‘populist pressures’ and moderate tariff hikes (ibid, 113). 
Backdoor reform continued with open access, the pillar of the 2003 Electricity 
Act. Increasing numbers of industrial and commercial consumers opted for captive 
generation from the 1980s on, despite its greater cost. (Others have illegally exited 
																																																								
18 Central Electricity Authority data, 31 August 2014. 
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through meter tampering and other forms of theft, as above.) This offered an 
opportunity to leverage reform, increase private investment, and bring in competition. 
The open access provisions of the Electricity Act thus amounted to a pragmatic attempt 
to institutionalize the exit option, putting pressure on SEBs as their most lucrative 
customers abandoned them. For Joseph (2010), this marks an attempt to reform 
distribution by the back door while avoiding directly antagonizing agriculturalists or 
State governments. In practice, however, many States have remained reluctant to cede 
control over such lucrative customers, resorting to high charges to discourage exit and 
thereby stymying distribution reform from above.19  
Today private participation is still concentrated in generation and (to a lesser 
extent) transmission, but remains limited in the sector’s more troubled segments. Only 
Odisha and Delhi, both of which lack strong farmer lobbies (as above), have privatized 
distribution, both before the 2003 Electricity Act. Attempts to award franchises for ring-
fenced urban networks have enjoyed mixed success in attracting bidders, while the 
private sector has so far largely stayed away from making large-scale investments in rural 
electrification (Mukherjee 2014, 13). In this context, the large rents that some private 
firms receive for their involvement amounts to a form of state compensation for the risks 
that they run in becoming embroiled in this most politicized of sectors. 
Similar policy initiatives resemble attempts to institutionalize a segmented, 
dualistic system more explicitly. Increasing attention to urban distribution franchises, the 
rise of short-term market power purchases alongside long-term contracts, and special 
economic zones with dedicated power plants again attempt to create parallel systems. 
Without decent regulation, such a solution risks ceding ‘all the family silver (big cities, 
industrial areas, and SEZs)’ to private players (Kumar and Chatterjee 2012, xiii). Lower-
revenue consumer categories, such as rural areas and small, poorer consumers, will be 
left to increasingly decrepit State utilities. In this way, ‘financially viable units (generally 
privately owned) and insolvent systems (generally state-owned) can co-exist’ (Victor and 
Heller 2007, 289).  
Other elements of reform have more closely cleaved to the state-centred model. 
From the mid-1970s, power CPSUs were created to permit greater central control and to 
provide examples of techno-managerial efficiency in the public sector. In parallel with the 
constitution of market organizations, this use of public ‘national champions’ continues, 
reworked in line with the market transition to give them a veneer of corporate 
																																																								
19 While several States comply on paper, Pargal and Banerjee (2014, 8) find that only one has so far 
specified a route to reduce the cross-subsidization surcharge and so facilitate open access in practice.  
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governance. Such firms place pressure on State-level utilities, threatening to deny supplies 
to defaulting States and forcing reforms on sectors and provinces—rural areas, ‘neo-
patrimonial’ States, perhaps even the coal industry—that have hitherto proved slow to 
change. In this light, reform in part appears a recalibration of the system to favour 
energy firms and CPSUs over ‘mass’ users. So Surya Sethi complains:  
 
The tariff increases and efficiency gains at the state utilities primarily guarantee 
the protected returns of bloated CPSUs and the private sector both of whom have 
gradually raised their stake in the sector and are, today, the dominant force 
because of being rewarded selectively with the highest regulated returns in the 
world. All this is at the cost of the state utilities… (2014, 19) 
 
Nor are these firms mere relicts. Statism’s resilience is bolstered by fears about energy 
security and the irrelevance of the global template outside its 1990s developed-world 
heartlands, a debate which raises the prospect of worldwide convergence between the 
extremes of liberalized power markets and central planning (Sen 2014). 
The result of these piecemeal reforms is a segmented system, a ‘hybrid market, 
where public and private investment coexist’ as the result of confused waves of change 
rather than coordinated policy choices (Gratwick and Eberhard 2008, 3958). As state 
agencies and older subsidies have proved difficult to demolish, reforms have simply 
overlaid new organizational structures atop the sediment of older organizations. This 
process has been far more haphazard, piecemeal, and faltering than the concept of 
stealthy, strategic ‘gradualism’ suggests.  
 
The sustainability of the state-market hybrid 
How sustainable and stable is this system, then? If segmentation and not institutional 
displacement has been the order of the game, is this process creating a durable alternative 
to the global standard of market-dominated ‘deregulatory’ power liberalization?  
India is not unique in its continued state intervention in the energy sector and 
heavy consumer subsidies for electricity: 40 per cent of global energy subsidies are found 
in developing countries (Lockwood 2014, 3). Hybrid state-market power systems are 
also found in a number of other large emerging economies. Reviewing the evidence 
across five countries, utility regulation specialists conclude that such hybrid systems are 
‘not a brief waypoint on the road to some Shangri-la textbook market organization’ 
(Victor and Heller 2007, 260). Instead, they offer a distinct and stable alternative to the 




a ‘dual market’, combining attributes of the state- and market-based systems… 
While not the most economically efficiency outcome, the dual market arises and 
is held in place by strong political forces that favour a system in which parts of 
power generation and delivery are profitable even as other parts are plagued by 
nonpayment, inadequate investment, and economically inefficient operation. 
(ibid, 30) 
 
In this vein, Joseph (2010) likens the Indian power sector to the ‘dual-track economy’ 
argued to be China’s successful reform strategy. Its gradual and backdoor reforms, she 
suggests, may permit ‘reform without losers’.  
Such an assessment appears complacent in the current scenario. As late as 
2011/12, India was the fourth largest provider of consumer-side fossil fuel subsidies in 
the world. Those above it—Saudi Arabia, Iran, Russia—enjoy far greater natural 
resource endowments, however. In contrast to many other subsidy-heavy countries, India 
is not fossil fuel-rich. Its ‘dual-track’ system has instead been funded through short-term 
means.  
India’s natural resources are directly passed on to both private power players, as 
well as through persistent coal theft (often with the collaboration of party politicians and 
bureaucrats). Profitable power and energy central state-owned enterprises are milked for 
resources through dividends, divestment (including cosmetic divestment—share buybacks 
and cross-holdings among SOEs—when private demand has been weak), underpricing, 
nonpayment by State utilities, and the transfer of assets to private firms. SOE divestment 
thus appears less a consistent project of ‘vacating the commanding heights of the 
economy’ than an attempt to mobilize resources, as the government remains the majority 
owner in such successful firms. 20  The result has been to undermine public sector 
enterprises despite their improved financial performance (Nagaraj 2015; Khanna 2015).  
In addition, public sector banks and term-lending institutions have bolstered 
investments in the power sector, providing loans at below-market rates. New 
infrastructure finance corporations have developed bonds and partial credit guarantees to 
push up ratings and thereby encourage long-term investments by pension funds and 
insurance companies, while State Bank of India and the Life Insurance Corporation have 
also been used to prop up share sales. This direction of investment helped to bring about 
the impressive capacity additions of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, based on target-beating 
																																																								
20 CPSU prospectuses make it clear that the state sets their direction and could require the enterprises to 
act in ways counter to the interests of profit-minded minority shareholders.  
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private investment. As growth slowed and the fuel crisis worsened, though, the banking 
sector was left overexposed to ‘subprime lending’ in the stagnating power sector. Non-
performing assets went up almost ten times between September 2011 and September 
2012, leading commentators to speculate about the risk of financial contagion 
(Bhattacharya and Patel 2011; Pargal and Banerjee 2014).  
The centre’s incentives for improved performance have also been weakened by 
political exigencies and the need to avoid financial contagion from overexposure to non-
performing assets in the power sector, creating moral hazard. This led to the second 
large-scale central bailout in a decade, a pattern that ‘looks set to continue’ or even 
worsen with the escalating fuel supply crisis since 2011 (Mukherjee 2014, 15). Again, as 
when the Dabhol power plant formerly owned by Enron was handed over to state-owned 
GAIL and NTPC, it appeared that the state had stepped in to socialize private sector 
losses.  
In the end, the system is funded through the suppression of demand: through 
load-shedding, especially at peak times. The two-tier strategy thus has obvious limits. It 
harms consumers and concentrates vast financial liabilities in the hands of the state 
(Victor and Heller 2007, 292), while many private firms have been burned by the fuel 
supply crisis and the sector’s overall financial and regulatory uncertainty (Mukherjee 
2014, 12). Further reform therefore appears inevitable, but the process of institutional 
change and the ultimate fate of state intervention in the sector are, I submit, likely to 
remain distinct from the global template for ‘liberalization’.  
 
Conclusion 
The spectre of the blind men and the elephant always looms over such a study. It is 
dangerous to extrapolate from the allocation of subsidies for a single good or service.21 
Nonetheless, the importance of electricity for capitalist accumulation, distributive 
politics, the state, and the environment make it a critical lens through which to 
understand India’s contemporary political economy.   
With this caveat, this chapter has sought to draw out two troublesome sets of 
ideas that post-1991 developments in the power sector offer for theories of liberalization 
in India. First, continuities in consumer subsidies show the limits of the state’s pro-
business turn and the resilience of agricultural power. Nonetheless, the political economy 
of power today is not reducible only ‘rural bias’: a wider set of elites also contribute, 
																																																								
21 Studying five different goods and services across three African countries, Kramon and Posner (2013) 
found that ‘the outcome one studies affects the answer one gets’: politicians and officials may 
compensate groups for higher tariffs in one area with subsidies in another.  
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including elite domestic consumers, well-connected firms (both domestic and private), 
and politicians. More broadly, the sector’s deep failings have created a situation that is 
increasingly recognized as a low-level equilibrium, which even some sets of agricultural 
elites admit might benefit from policy change.  
 These plural and competing elites tug power policy in different directions, 
magnified by state fragmentation on both vertical and horizontal lines. Such fraught 
political dynamics have created a distinctive trajectory of institutional change in the 
sector. Power reform has proceeded not through displacement of older statist 
organizations, but through ad hoc institutional layering. The result is a dysfunctional 
state-market hybrid, with market institutions and private participation grafted onto a 
loss-making state sector. This system is financed through short-term exploitation of 
natural resources and the state-owned enterprises that dominate them. Unlike its 
equivalents in resource-rich emerging economies, then, this hybrid system is neither 
stable nor coherent.  
If it does not amount to a coherent model for the power sector, the dualistic 
dynamic of institutional change that has emerged from dominant class competition may 
indeed be a hallmark of Indian liberalization. It captures the surprising resilience, and 
neglect, of the public sector (Nagaraj 2015; Khanna 2015), even as valuable segments of 
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